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KLAUTAU: Realism and Mythopoeia

INTRODUCTION
According to Anderson and Flieger (2014: 9), J.R.R. Tolkien’s essay On Fairystories is a “landmark in its field.” In this essay, originally delivered as a lecture in
1939, and then published in 1947, Tolkien investigates the definitions, origins and
aims of this literary genre, establishing connections between fairy-stories,
philosophy, and religion which were not much debated at that time. However, some
have criticized the essay, notably Tom Shippey (1992: 45), who considered it
Tolkien’s least successful piece due to its lack of a precise philological kernel.
In On Fairy-stories, Tolkien (2014: 27) sets himself the task of answering
three questions: ‘What are fairy-stories? What is their origin? What is the use of
them?’. As a philologist at the University of Oxford, Tolkien displays his erudition
about the European philological and folkloric collections available in his time, such
as those of the Brothers Grimm, Charles Perrault, and, more importantly, Andrew
Lang. Moreover, and unsurprisingly, he shows how knowledgeable he was about
the philological theories on mythology and proposes a historical and philosophical
reflection about the meaning of imagination and the religious tradition in the face
of the technical and scientific progress.
The aim of this article is to argue that an adequate interpretation of that essay
is promoted not by philology, even though it is considered in the text, but by the
hermeneutics based on the philosophical tradition known as “realism” (see Brague
2013: 36–41; Pieper 2007: 55–69; and Reale 2014: 91–100). In short, philosophical
realism is founded on the scholastic interpretation of the anthropological,
gnoseological, moral, and ontological postulates inaugurated by Plato and Aristotle,
which then comes to terms with Christianity through the Church Fathers (e.g., St.
Augustine) and finally comes to be systematized in the medieval summae.
Such an interpretive view in On Fairy-stories emerges from the relationship
between literary production and aspects of Christian philosophy, and, in that sense,
the fundamental concept coined by Tolkien is sub-creation, specifically its
connection with fantasy as contemplation. By offering this thesis, Tolkien
highlights the connection between his theory about fairy-stories and the tradition of
Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas. It is known that Tolkien studied
Classics at Exeter College, Oxford, between 1911 and 1913, and, during that time, he
had systematic contact with Greek authors of tragedies, not to mention Plato’s
dialogues (see Hammond and Scull 2017: 34, 44).
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In addition to his well-known Catholic faith, widely acknowledged in his
biographies, the organization itself of his literary conception is permeated by a
worldview which is inspired by the medieval scholasticism that informed his
childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. This theological perspective resurfaced in
modern interpretations at the end of the nineteenth century, springing from the
encyclical Aeterni Patris, promulgated by Pope Leo XIII in 1879, which established
the Thomistic philosophy as the primary orientation for Catholics. It is relevant as
well to highlight the legacy of Cardinal John Henry Newman, a scholar of patristics,
founder and mentor of the Birmingham Oratory, with which Tolkien’s guardian,
Father Francis Morgan, was associated (Carpenter 2002: 44).
Even though Tolkien was not himself a philosopher or theologian, he was
an academic keen on Antiquity and the Middle Ages, and while his investigation
lacked the system of scholastic thought, he weaved analogies, made comparisons,
and added philosophical and theological references to his own reflections. More
than an intricate treatise on Logic, Tolkien’s essay shows his speculations more
freely, unrestrainedly alternating between his philosophical interlocutors, now
holding conversation with Plato and Aristotle, never losing sight of the
paradigmatic reference of Christian tradition, be it the thought of Augustine or
Aquinas.
Presenting Tolkien’s investigation as literary theory calls for a delimitation
on the meaning implied by that expression. The hermeneutic premises of this article
starts from a philosophical perspective, so that the goal is not mainly directed
towards the arguments advanced by literary critics at the time the essay was written.
As mentioned before, we opted highlight the medium through which Tolkien
reflected upon his own religious intellectual upbringing, i.e., through philosophical
realism, particularly the recrudescent Neo-Thomism at the end of the nineteenth
century. Therefore, literary theory is the group of concepts that form a
comprehensive unity of the literary phenomenon, the fairy-story genre, in this case.
Such comprehensive unity is configured by the delimitation of the nature, or
essence, of fairy-stories. Both words or variations of them are used throughout the
essay (Tolkien 2014: 32, 42 et passim).
The choice of the words nature and essence shows the possibility of
interpretation through philosophy. Essence is one of the translations of the Greek
word eidos, found both in Plato and Aristotle. It may also be translated as form or
idea, referring to the structuring principle of the reality of being, and is directly
related to nature (physis), understood as the principle of realization of the essence
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in a concrete and individual being. For Plato, the essences are to be found in the
World of Forms, a metaphor for the intelligible and immaterial dimension of reality,
as substances in themselves, while for Aristotle they are in the individual being and
can be abstracted by our intellect in the process of knowing. Indeed, to know
something is to contemplate its essence (see Pieper 2007: 23–38 and Reale 2014:
155–60), and the definition of theory is precisely that contemplation.
Indeed, one can understand such contemplation (theoria) in three
intertwined ways. Firstly, in the Republic (6, 486a), Plato claims that theory is the
view of the totality of things. Secondly, in the explanation of the famous allegory
of the cave (7, 517a–520c), he affirms that contemplation is the sight of the soul in
its organ of knowledge, that is, the understanding of the intelligible beyond what is
sensorial. Finally, in the same passage, Plato affirms that contemplation is different
from craft, art (téchné), because it does not seek usefulness or domination, but the
very realization of human nature through the comprehension of things.
To study our object according to the realist perspective of the abovementioned authors, we have chosen four conceptual boundaries according to the
Summa Theologica:
1. Nature and supernatural (I-II, q.114);
2. Art as an intellectual virtue (I-II, q.57), inscribing such activity into its
mode of mythmaking (mythopoeia), in dialogue with Aristotle’s Poetics and Plato’s
Republic;
3. Active intellect and mythopoeia (I, q.87) in dialogue with Aristotle’s De
Anima;
4. The function of fantasy in relation to truth, particularly in education to
contemplation (II-II, q.180), bringing up Augustine’s On the Trinity, concerning the
function of memory and imagination, and Plato’s challenge in the Republic,
requiring that poets present an argument to ensure their permanence in the polis, as
long as they justify poetry as an art in harmony with philosophical activity.
These four issues—natural and supernatural, art as an intellectual virtue,
active intellect and the function of fantasy in contemplation—substantiate
Tolkien’s connection with the realist tradition of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and
Thomas Aquinas, further supported by scholars such as Milbank (2007: 15), Candler
(2008: 140-148), Anderson and Flieger (2014: 19–20, 110), McIntosh (2017: 8–28),
and Testi (2018: 42, 68, 80).
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RELIGION, NATURE, ART, AND CONTEMPLATION
A good way to start our investigation is to define fairy-stories according to Tolkien.
For him, such narratives do not deal specifically with fairies—conventionally
regarded from the nineteenth century onwards as minute beings with magical
powers—but with Man’s experience in the imaginary realm called Faërie. For
Tolkien (2014: 44), fairy-stories have three faces:
the Mystical towards the Supernatural; the Magical towards Nature;
and the Mirror of scorn and pity towards Man. The essential face of
Faërie is the middle one, the Magical. But the degree in which the
others appear (if at all) is variable, and may be decided by the
individual story-teller.
The perspective of the mirror of scorn and pity directed toward Man could be
related to the genre of Greek tragedy, particularly according to Aristotle’s Poetics
(see Anderson and Flieger 2014: 19–20, 110). The most striking reference to that is
Tolkien’s inclusion, in his essay, of lines from his poem Mythopoeia.1 Variations
of the term “mythopoeia” can be found in Plato’s Republic (2, 377–379), in
reference to storytellers (mythopaios), and in Poetics (1451b–1452a), in which it is
affirmed that the poets’ production is much more related to the making of myths
(mython poieten) than of verses (understood as metrical and syntactic rules).
The essential face of fairy-stories, for Tolkien, is the second one, the
Magical, which is related to Nature. According to Testi (2018: 68), Tolkien
conceived nature similarly to Aristotle’s and Thomas Aquinas’s philosophical
realism, according to which the term “nature” encompasses the set of abilities and
attitudes inherent to the diverse beings, whether material, vegetable, animal, or
human. Such a concept of “physics” (physis) as “nature” is attributed to the
operating principle of the beings (i.e., the substantial forms that are realized in
matter), not only as material structure (biological, chemical, or physical), nor as
1 The poem Mythopoeia was written in the 1930s but was published only in the late 1980s. It is a
dialogue between Philomythus (the “Myth-lover”) and the Misomythus (the “Myth-hater”), in
which they discuss the validity of myth as a conveyor of truth. It is a consensus to relate the theme
and structure of the poem to the dialogues Tolkien held with C.S. Lewis about religion,
mythology, and fantasy (see Anderson and Flieger 2014: 113).
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environment or ecosystem. Therefore, nature is also teleological because it
presupposes an end (telos), a meaning, a purpose in every being whose operating
principle contains a goal which is inherent to their nature. Likewise, the anthropological distinction between nature and culture, typical of Tolkien’s time and
philological environment, cannot be fitted into the concept of nature as physis.
Finally, the third face is related to the Supernatural. The word supernatural
is used five times by Tolkien in the essay, and it is related to the Elves, Men, and
the mythical gods (Tolkien 2014: 28, 43–4). First, Tolkien denies that Fairies, or
Elves, are supernatural, unless the prefix “super” is used as a superlative prefix. He
claims that it is Men who possess a dimension that exceeds nature (Tolkien 2014:
28, 81), while Fairies are qualified as “natural”. He claims, moreover, that the gods
of mythology, being devised by Man’s imagination, receive the shadow and the
flicker of divinity, thus becoming truly supernatural.
NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL
Following Aristotle’s concept, Tolkien understands that “nature” is not only the
environment, the whole of living things, but the principle of operation inherent to
each being, modulating their development and purpose (telos) of realization (Testi
2018: 68). According to the scholastic tradition the word “supernatural” is used to
refer to the principle of the whole Creation (understood as the nature of the beings
as an autonomous activity), to God as Subsisting Being (Ipsum Esse Subsistens)
and His Omnipotence in relation to Creation. Such a sense can be exemplified by
the question in the Summa Theologica mentioned in the introduction of this article
(I-II, q.114). There, it is demonstrated that without Divine Grace, a supernatural gift,
it is impossible for Man to reach salvation, thus posing a heavy contrast between
moral merit—an operation principle of the individual themself—and the need for
supernatural aid to reach eternal life, which is gifted by God out of sheer love
(caritas).
According to Marie-Joseph Nicolas (2001: 98), the word “supernatural” was
conceived by St. Thomas Aquinas primarily in relation to the substance, that is, the
origin and foundations of the effect that are above Creation, in a spiritual and
intelligible way, such as divine revelations, innate knowledge, Incarnation,
“supernature” being God Himself. Another way to understand supernatural, in a
improper way, is concerning its mode, which refers to everything that does not
conform to what is daily and ordinary, such as the sudden healing of a sick person,
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the return from the dead, or an unusual behavior—according to the contemporary
science—by animals or the forces of nature, such as miracles or angelic/demonic
intervention. In this second use of the word, “supernatural” phenomena are part of
the Creation, however uncommon.
That is the precise concept of Supernatural one finds in Tolkien’s On Fairystories. Fairies are supernatural only in that they are superlatively connected to the
Creation, for they are expressions of nature itself as possibilities of contemplation,
hence their ability to integrate the quality of other substances present in material
concreteness—water, earth, trees, wind, flowers, rocks, fire—including men
themselves, normally merged with the elements (Elves of the Air; Stone Dwarves)
or with other animals (wolf or bat shapeshifters, little men living in rabbit holes,
and talking eagles).
On the other hand, only Man can establish a relationship to God and seek
transcendence, through Creation itself as nature, noticing the operational principles
of existing things and rationally investigating the confines of Existence. In connection with this, Tolkien (2014: 34–35) claims that the desires satisfied by the writing
and reading of fairy-stories are the “communion with other living things,” since
they are connected in the chain of Being, founded on God Himself, and the “survey
[of] the depths of space and time,” by using intelligence to contemplate the order
of Creation, traversing created things and finding the supernatural principle, the
Subsisting Being which is the cause of the whole nature, but is not restricted to it.
By living the mystical-religious experience with the transcendent, Man surpasses
nature (understood as the group of created things) and, therefore, is more supernatural than fairies. As in Greek thought, the contemplation (theoria) of the essence
(eidos) of Man, of the world, and the Transcendent is the basis of Christian
medieval philosophy as a means to fulfill the purpose (telos) of human nature.
Some context regarding Tolkien’s essay within the framework of the
debates about mythology and fairy-stories is necessary. According to Flieger (2003:
26–29), the nineteenth century was the golden age of studies about mythology and
folklore, particularly from the standpoint of philology and anthropology. Based on
the nationalism stimulated by romanticism, scholars of those areas of knowledge
sought a mythical identity for their nation states, often turning to the folkloric
narratives and legends as the symbolic foundation of their people. In this sense,
Tolkien establishes a dialogue, in On Fairy-stories (2014: 41–44), both with Max
Müller and Andrew Lang, who represent conflicting views about the origins of such
mythologies. For if Max Müller regarded mythology as a disease of language—a
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deviation from the original reference to natural phenomena, anthropomorphized
into deities—Andrew Lang in turn claimed, from the standpoint of the
anthropological theories of his time, that mythology was an expression of Men’s
infantilization and primitivism arising from the fabulation of their most barbaric
and irrational actions. In keeping with the thesis of this article, Tolkien’s criticism
of both—including the disputed meaning of mythopoeic, used by Müller (Flieger
2003: 30)—must be understood in the light of the realist philosophical tradition.
The devising of mythological gods occurs in that context. In describing
Thor, for instance, Tolkien highlights some elements: his violent temper, his red
beard, the power of storms, lightning and thunder, and the marvel before a deity, of
a primordial, omnipotent cause permeating the whole of reality (Tolkien 2014: 43–
44). Thor’s personality derives from the class of blacksmiths, farmers and Norse
warriors who worshipped the god himself and mirrored his existence in their
imagination; the power of lightning and thunder was the spectacle celestial nature
offered in the stormy nights of the North, while the flicker and the shadow hovered
over existence infinitely, overflowing it with the causal power of existence. The
latter aspect, which transcends both human personality and the marvel before
Creation, is the Supernatural, the invisible world upholding the visible.
It is important to emphasize that this mythological composition of Thor
described by Tolkien—which integrates I. characteristics of human personality; II.
the amazement before the phenomena of nature; III. the perception of divinity—
should not be understood as a panentheistic speculation, that is, a perspective that
merges the essence of God with his Creation, even though such divine essence
surpasses creation. This is not a description of Thor as if he were a real god in the
Primary World, a subsidiary entity of the Creator. In fact, Tolkien is analyzing the
composition of the mythical figure of Thor in the imagination of his worshipers and
poets, showing elements of reality that served as material for this configuration in
their minds.
In other words, in addition to the human virtues and vices and the qualities
of natural phenomena, there is a third characteristic present at the origin of both
myths and fairy-stories: the Supernatural. Tolkien (2014: 43) claims that men drew
from nature the beauties with which they imaginatively adorned the gods, just as
divine personalities could only be derived from human ones. However, the
reverence, veneration, adoration and love those men devoted to the gods came,
equally, through the human mind, from what Tolkien calls the invisible world, the
Supernatural. In fact, although they are not the same thing, there is a relationship
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between mythology and Divinity, the latter being the only one that has the right to
claim the worship of man.
Something really ‘higher’ is occasionally glimpsed in mythology:
Divinity, the right to power (as distinct from its possession), the due
worship; in fact ‘religion’. Andrew Lang said, and is by some still
commended for saying, that mythology and religion (in the strict
sense of that world) are two distinct things that have become
inextricably entangled, though mythology is in itself almost devoid
of religious significance. (Tolkien, 2014: 44)
By mentioning Andrew Lang at this point of the essay, Tolkien includes a note
referring the reader to Christopher Dawson’s Progress and Religion, in which the
latter defends the thesis that mythology is different from religion (1945: 86–91), a
conclusion that arises from ethnographical and anthropological studies of the time
(late nineteenth century and early twentieth). According to Lang’s theory, religion
is about the worshipping of the founding power of the world, while mythology
seeks to explain the phenomena in a mythic and fantastic way, usually referring
originally to primitive, savage, and irrational customs (Flieger, 2003: 33–34).
For Dawson, the essence of religion is not the belief in mythological beings,
but “an obscure and confused intuition of transcendent being—an “ocean of
supernatural energy,” “pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum””
(Dawson, 1945: 90), a Latin quote straight from Thomas Aquinas’s Summa
Theologica, (I, q.13, a.2) which is related to the Subsisting Being (Ipsum Esse
Subsistens). In that context, according to Tolkien (2014: 42–43), fairy-stories share
the same kind of “mind building” of allegedly nobler myths, such as the Greek or
Norse ones, even though relegated to more prosaic perspectives, being composed
by human qualities (the condition of Man), natural (the environmental phenomena
of Creation) and supernatural (in that they evoke Divine Transcendence).
ART AS AN INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE
In the second issue proposed by this article, we emphasized the expression Subcreation as an intellectual virtue of art, according to the philosophy of Aquinas.
Tolkien uses the terms sub-creator/Sub-creation three times in his essay (2014: 42,
59, 78). In the first mention, he refers to the imaginative devising of myths and
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fairy-stories, such as Thor, but mostly to the mental operation of Man, who transfers
qualities from one thing to another, bringing about an innovative resignification.
This can be seen, for instance, when one gives wings to a man, symbolizing his
proximity to the skies and to God; or coloring green the face of a deceased who still
is able to move, thus creating a frightful undead. Such a perspective of Art as téchné
and poiesis, in the Aristotelian and Thomist tradition, is endorsed by Alison
Milbank (2007: 21, 23, 142–43, 166–68) and Jonathan McIntosh (2017: 6, 21–24),
particularly in the relationship those authors establish between Tolkien’s theoretical
assumptions and the philosophical foundations of Jacques Maritain in his Art and
Scholasticism, emphasizing the romantic view of nature in search of a (neo)Thomist
synthesis, something characteristic of European Catholics in the first half of the
twentieth century.
This artistic sense of sub-creation is compared to Magic (Tolkien 2014: 32),
a word used in a somewhat unstable way throughout the essay, given that the author
himself changes its use as he proceeds. On the one hand, the word “Magic” is
understood simply as the human capacity to change reality, which, for Tolkien
(2014: 63) is equivalent to Art (téchné), a close concept to modern technology,
morally neutral, as we can read in the letter 131, sent to Milton Waldman, probably
written in 1951 (Tolkien 1995: 145-46). On the other hand, the word is also used to
describe the manipulation of Man’s will, such as the Platonic goeteia used in the
Republic (3, 413c), the crafts and charms used to test young people’s virtue during
their training to become guardians of the city. Again, in the letter to Waldman,
Tolkien (2014: 146) affirms that morally evil purposes in the use of magic will lead
to “the corrupted motive of dominating: bulldozing the real world, or coercing other
wills.”
In fact, in the unsent passage of a letter to Naomi Mitchison on 25 September
1954, Tolkien (1995: 199–200) develops his concept of “magic”, distinguishing it
from goeteia. In Tolkien’s legendarium, magia or even goeteia are not good or evil
per se but morally conditioned by their purpose or their use. The bad motive, for
Tolkien, was the domination of wills, such as the Platonic goeteia, even though
Sauron, through his machinery, also produced real effects in the physical world
(magic as téchné seeking usefulness). On the other hand, the Elves also used magic
as a technique to produce physical effects (“like fire in wet faggot”). In the same
draft, Tolkien claims that the basic motive for magic is the reduction “of the gap
between the idea or desire and the result or effect” (Tolkien 1995: 200).
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In the essay, Tolkien (2014: 64) refers to Magic in a third way as well, an
elvish Enchantment engendering mythopoeic art, closely connected to language
(Shippey 1992: 46–50), enabling mythmaking (poiesis), Faërie itself, whose end is
wonder (thaumaston)2 before nature, arising from new sub-creative fabulations
(Tolkien 1995: 146), but not deceitfully: the goetic effect is purely artistic (Tolkien
1995: 200). This elvish Enchantment is a form of goeteia (in the sense of molding
men's desires and feelings) and at the same time an art (despite being a technique
whose material alteration in the world is language itself). However, in line with
Plato's conception of theory, this third conception of magic has as its objective
neither the domination of hearts and minds nor the instrumental usefulness of real
world, but the wonder (contemplation) at Creation.
In summary, the basis of sub-creation is the function of devising images,
imagination. Such a definition for imagination (phantasia) is Aristotle’s in De
Anima (427b16–428b30), in which he describes the ability of human mind to form
images (phantasma), much as Tolkien (2014: 59) himself defines imagination in the
essay, relating it with fantasy. The difference between the simple capacity of
forming images in the mind, i.e., imagination—particularly understood as
memory—and the capacity of creating inexistent forms in primary reality, i.e.,
fantasy, is that the latter is the product of this art: the sub-creative literary work. It
is in that passage that Tolkien (2014: 59) mentions Sub-creation for the second time.
Fantasy is the connection between the images produced by imagination (memory),
and the finalized artistic expression in a text, sub-creation, whose excellence, for
Tolkien, depends on the “inner consistency of reality.”
In order to understand what “inner consistency of reality” means, one should
go back to the Summa Theologica (I-II, q.57), in which Aquinas explains that art as
a practical intellectual virtue, whose end is to create something beyond Man, must
be in consonance with the speculative intellectual virtues, i.e., science,
understanding, wisdom. They are responsible for the excellence in comprehending
reality as it is: science searches for the necessary causes of things; understanding
investigates the logical principles of thought (such as the noncontradiction, identity,

2 The expression “wonderful” (thaumaston) is repeated in Aristotle’s Poetics (1452a, 1456a, 1460a),
and refers to contemplation, admiration, and wonder in the face of reality, which is
incomprehensible and irrational, prompting poetic description and the search for a philosophical
explanation. In his essay, Tolkien employs the expressions wonder and marvel in much the same
way as Greek thaumaston.
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and the excluded middle); and wisdom searches for the first principles of reality, of
Being as Being (Metaphysics itself).
In sum, Art, both for Aristotle and Aquinas, comprises the Beautiful, the
Good, and the True, thus integrating the realist tradition. It is a practical activity
which must follow the parameters of reality which inspires it, even if it contributes
in an unprecedented way to that reality. That is the “inner consistency of reality” to
which Tolkien referred. Indeed, according to Castro (2009: 88–89), education for
Aristotle is based on the formative unity comprising nature (physis), habit (ethos),
and reason (logos), the latter being enhanced by the integration of intellectual
virtues, whether practical or speculative. For Reale (2014: 75, 158–60) and Brague
(2013: 38–39), that is the classical concept of Beauty. For Plato, as one can perceive
from Phaedrus (272d–274b), and indeed for the whole classical tradition, Beauty is
Goodness in visible form, that is, the revelation of the supersensible by perceptible
senses. Therefore, Beauty is always an expression of Goodness and Truth. As
supported by Candler (2008: 140-144), this conception of art as intellectual virtue is
in dialogue with Tolkien’s theory.
Such a reflection can seem strange within an essay about fantasy, but
Tolkien (2014: 60) claims that that strangeness is an advantage of Fantasy as the
basis of fairy-stories, provoking a contemplative look upon reality. That is the
recovery function of fairy-stories (Tolkien 2014: 67–68). He further claims that the
more dissimilar sub-creation is from the Primary World, the more skill is required
from the sub-creator to maintain the inner consistency of reality. Hence his
insistence on the goal (telos) of fantastic literature as a source of possibilities to a
new outlook on the world (Tolkien 2014: 65–66), recovering the meaning of words
in relation to their tangible referents in the world from a strangeness that is capable
of generating wonder.
Thus, the integration of Truth, Goodness and Beauty is expressed in the
affirmation of Fantasy as a rational and artistic activity (Tolkien 2014: 59–60) and,
because of that, it is necessarily linked to Truth in its inner consistency of reality,
just like “Good versus Wicked” (Tolkien 2014: 53), important both in the Primary
and the Secondary Worlds, and the desire of Man’s heart for a world with dragons,
because it would be richer and more beautiful (Tolkien 2014: 55). With respect to
moral Goodness specifically, McIntosh (2017: 211–22) and Testi (2018: 127–36)
affirm that Tolkien understood the laws of moral and virtue, foundations of realist
philosophy, as necessarily consonant elements between Creation and sub-creation.
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Returning to Aristotle’s Poetics (1452b–1452a), we reaffirm his
recommendation that a poet should be a mythmaker (mython poieten), considering
Tolkien’s poem Mythopoeia (2014: 65). Some of its lines are quoted in On Fairystories and the word sub-creator is also found there. In chapter 9 of the Poetics
(1451a15-1451b11), poets are also instructed to follow the requirements of necessity
(ananké) and likeliness (eikos) in artistic composition, such as those found in reality
by the intellectual virtues of science, understanding and wisdom in their search for
the universals. The Aristotelian postulates are an important endorsement to the
philosophical interpretation of Tolkien’s inner consistency of reality: the inner
consistency of a sub-created work must be in metaphysical consonance with the
primary reality, apart from showing an internal coherence within the sub-created
world itself, contained in its own fictional universe.
Even though the concept of mythopoeia comes from Antiquity, Christian
appropriation of it reached its apex during Romanticism. In the case of On Fairystories, the most explicit presence of Romanticism appears in the comparison
between S.T. Coleridge’s ‘suspension of disbelief’ (Anderson & Flieger 2014: 107)
and Tolkien’s concept of ‘secondary belief’ (2014: 52–53). However, as shown by
Milbank (2007: 10–25, 142–48), even though Tolkien shared with the romantics both
the criticism of Enlightenment—with its rationalist and empiricist verve—and the
renovation of interest in nature’s symbolism inspired by Neoplatonism and the
investigation of interiority, his Catholic, Neo-Thomist formation, informed by Pope
Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris and Cardinal Newman’s legacy, led him
beyond Romanticism and to try to conciliate his faith and his reflections about
fantasy and imagination with the realist philosophical tradition.
In the letter n. 153, dated September 1954, Tolkien explains to the Catholic
editor Peter Hastings the metaphysical considerations in The Lord of the Rings,
especially the nature of created beings and the limits of their free will and moral
conscience. He touches on issues concerning Creation and Divine Omnipotence,
making some concepts of the intellectual virtues (the laws of contradiction) explicit:
We differ entirely about the nature of the relation of sub-creation to
Creation. I should have said that liberation ‘from the channels the
creator is known to have used already’ is the fundamental function
of ‘sub-creation’, a tribute to the infinity of His potential variety,
one of the ways in which indeed it is exhibited, as indeed I said in
the Essay. I am not a metaphysician; but I should have thought it a
curious metaphysic— there is not one but many, indeed potentially
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innumerable ones—that declared the channels known (in such a
finite comer as we have any inkling of) to have been used, are the
only possible ones, or efficacious, or possibly acceptable to and by
Him! […]
Are there any ‘bounds to a writer’s job’ except those imposed
by his own finiteness? No bounds, but the laws of contradiction, I
should think. […] I would claim, if I did not think it presumptuous
in one so ill-instructed, to have as one object the elucidation of truth,
and the encouragement of good morals in this real world, by the
ancient device of exemplifying them in unfamiliar embodiments,
that may tend to ‘bring them home’. (Tolkien 1995: 188–94)
In this quote, the bound between Primary World and Secondary World is presented
as a sub-creative dynamic between the perception of reality in a metaphysical sense,
and the original artistic contribution of the mythmaking. From this perspective, the
third use of the expression sub-creation appears when Tolkien (2014: 78) describes
the gospels as the response to human yearning for eucatastrophe, a word he coined
for the good catastrophe, the sudden turn to the happy ending in fairy-stories. The
word pathos, which could be translated as “catastrophe”, can be found in Aristotle’s
Poetics (1452b9), meaning a painful event present in tragic narrative, a turn to
suffering.
Tolkien’s eucatastrophe refers to the common element in fairy-stories as a
sub-creative expression of a hope of conquering Evil, despite the unavoidable
suffering in the world. Taking Christian narrative as a historical fact, Tolkien (2014:
p. 78–79) describes it as the concrete answer to all the desires of sub-creation in its
search for redemption, happiness, joy. He emphasizes that the gospels possess the
inner consistency of reality because, apart from their marvels, perfect in their
mythical significance—dealing with Man, Nature, and the Divine—they are the
result of art as an intellectual virtue, because the evangelists themselves were not
expert mythmakers: it was the Author of Creation and of the Primary World, God
Almighty, who wrote the reality of that narrative with facts.
Tolkien’s insistence in professing the truthfulness of the gospels (2014: 78),
in spite of using the words story and myth to describe them literarily, can be
summed up in the conclusion that, in the case of the gospels, legend and history are
fused, bringing all the elements of fantasy to the primary reality of Incarnation. A
note about Tolkien’s Mythopoeia is here apposite. In the complete poem, as
mentioned before, we are introduced to the Philomythus, the lover of myths. Testi
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(2018: 80) affirms that the word philomythus is borrowed by Tolkien from
Aristotle’s Metaphysics (982b1–983a1), referring to the individual who is perplexed
by the marvels of which myths are made. Such admiration is the same of the one
who loves wisdom, i.e., the philosophos: it is, according to Pieper (2017: 40–54) a
necessary condition for a correct perception, purely receptive, of reality, the true
platonic theoria.
Therefore, both the Philomythus, borrowed by Tolkien from Aristotle—who
in turn brought the Homeric poetic contemplation to the philosophy derived from
Plato—and the philosophical Logos claimed by the author of the Fourth Gospel as
a way of talking about Christ, are united in the admiration of the wonders provided
by both reality and fantasy, ordained in the inner consistency of sub-creations,
whose purpose (telos) is the same as that experienced in contemplating what is real.
Tolkien understands that the gospels are a story through that analogy of a
philosophical perception of the importance of mythology: the gospels contain the
essence of myth, describing marvels (thaumaston), the great eucatastrophe of the
Primary World, the paradigm par excellence, satisfying the human desires that
originate sub-creative art.
ACTIVE INTELLECT AND MYTHOPOEIA
In the essay, when referring to the process of mythmaking, Tolkien (2014: 41)
employs the words generalization and abstraction, two processes used by the
human mind to engage with reality. Realist tradition (Gardeil 2013: 110–22)
understands that we know the universals, the forms or essence of things, by noticing
the constitutive principle of an individual thing, abstracting (i.e., intellectually
“plucking”) the form of the thing we perceive through the senses.
This operation allows us to shape this universality, generalizing (i.e.,
shaping the genre of) a particular aspect and attributing it to other individuals of
similar nature. Such processes can be found in Aristotle’s De Anima (430a10–
430a25), in the concept later denominated by medieval hermeneutics as active
intellect (nous poietikos), translated by St. Thomas as intellectus agens in the
Summa Theologica (I, q. 87, a.1). The active intellect is responsible for the mental
dynamics that structure the passage of the potentialities of being known, which are
inherent to the objects, to actuality in mind, allowing them (objects) to be
apprehended. Just like the active intellect generalizes and abstracts the universal
forms from the perception of material things, it is also the efficient cause of
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realization, by means of poetic language, of the fantastic forms which make up
Faery itself, by recombining elements from the Primary World.
When he mentions the adjective as something fundamental in the origins of
fairy-stories, Tolkien (2014: 41) highlights a third operation of the mind which
follows realist gnoseology: discrimination. By affirming that the grass is green,3 the
human mind distinguishes between substance and accidents, which Aristotle
explains in his Categories (1b10–4b21). By discriminating that “grass” is the
substance, the thing itself, and that “green” is an accident, something not essential
to grass — which could be yellow, when dry, or black, when burnt, or brown, when
covered in mud—human mind opens the possibility of recombining substances and
accidents imaginarily, fantastically. Thus, it is possible to imagine some
paradisiacal golden grass, or frightening fiery grass.
The stress on generalization, abstraction, and discrimination reinforces the
reality of the world outside the mind, independent of language, which is, in fact,
associated to the referent as perceived by the senses. St. Thomas endorses this view
in his Summa Theologica (I, q.85, a. I), but Tolkien emphasizes that the incarnated
mind, language, and story appear simultaneously in human development. The
incarnated mind perceives the world as something independent, but it can only
realize such a perception through language, which metaphorically creates the world
it perceives. In the interplay between mind, language, and reality, all of them
recombining substances and accidents, the possibility of begetting a new
composition out of elements from the reality, inside the mind, by language,
originates fairy-stories, the means Men possess to access Faery.
Tolkien presents the relationship between language, mind, and extramental
world as the origin of fairy-stories and myth. This presupposes a universal
functioning of human mind, which reaches far back to primitive men. Hence, the
creation of the adjective as an expression of the three operations—generalization,
abstraction, and discrimination—reflects both the human intellective capacity of
distinguishing substances and accidents, and the possibility of imaginatively
recombining these components.

3 It is undeniable that Tolkien was impacted and influenced by Owen Barfield’s theory of language
put forward in Poetic Diction, which deals with language, myth, and human perception (cf.
Flieger, 2002). However, while both Tolkien and Barfield criticized Max Müller, being supporters
of the metaphysical perspectives, the difference between Barfield’s Anthroposophy and Tolkien’s
Catholicism legitimates the identification of the active intellect in Tolkienian theory.
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According to Tom Shippey (1992: 46–50), the use of the words spell,
enchantment, and glamour in the original text, referring to the magic of Faërie,
reinforces the orchestration between concrete and abstract in fantastic language,
which defines its incantatory power. This conception of magic is close to the third
form presented by Tolkien, which refers to the Enchantment of the Elves, different
both from the goeteia that seeks the domination of the will and from the magic as
the neutral technique of altering material reality (usefulness). In this sense, it is the
Elvish Enchantment that manifests itself through poetic language.
Even more explicitly, Tolkien (2014: 42) stresses that Faërie begins when a
quality (adjective) is removed from an extramental thing and is recombined in an
imaginary, fantastic reality, conjoining many characteristics through the mind, and
then materialized in language. At this point in the essay Tolkien (2014: 42)
introduces the concept of sub-creator. In sum, what inaugurates Faërie is the
creation of a new form, which is necessarily related to the objective qualities of the
extramental things perceived by the artist and that, at the same time, is the
contribution of Man, sub-creator, to Creation, the Primary World which is the work
of the only Creator. Accordingly, Jonathan McIntosh (2017: 18–19), reaffirming
Tolkien’s realism, argues that
For Tolkien and Thomas, things, being created by a God who is
himself Being, are inescapably real. Things are there, they exist,
they have their own mind-independent reality, yet a reality which,
because dependent upon the divine mind by virtue of their createdness, at the same time has a constitutional affinity with those human
minds (created in God’s image) that know and experience them.
It is important to emphasize the realistic essence of sub-creation. The conception
of sub-creator is not a mere metaphor for the storyteller, but a double affirmation:
first, gnoseological, because it presupposes certain organization of the human mind
in its dynamics of sense, imagination, and intellect; second, metaphysical, because
it understands the dynamics of incarnated human mind as part of an extramental
reality possessing objective laws which can be partially comprehended by Man.
The affirmation of such a capacity of access, and the formulation of the objective
reality by human intelligence justifies our calling this philosophical perspective
“realist tradition”. As Candler (2008: 145-148) explains, Tolkien follows this
analogical conception of reality, which means that there is a consonance between
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things (physical, imaginary, and spiritual) in this world. The rediscovery of reality
stems from its re-enchantment by the strangeness of the fantastic that is based in
the operation of the active intellect.
In this sense, Aristotle (1459a1-1459a9) in his Poetics states that for the poet
to express themself well in metaphors they need to apprehend (theorein) the
similarity and the difference between names and things. This contrast cannot be
understood only by comparing mere names, that is, it must be guided by the
apprehension of the extralinguistic existence of things. This means that a poet, in
order to metaphorize well, must be skillful and virtuous in apprehending reality. In
view of this, what the storyteller does is the artistic expression of said gnoseology
in an individual who contemplates reality. The possibility of accessing Faërie
through sub-creation, operated by language, results from understanding the
composition of things and from the making of new forms. For Tolkien (2014: 35),
the essential power of Faërie is to capture, literarily, the fantastic visions and satisfy
the desire to realize the imagined marvel through mythmaking.
FANTASY AND CONTEMPLATION
The path we have walked so far leads us to the final question of this article: the
function of fantasy in relation to truth. We have seen above that sub-creation is a
result of fantasy, which is, in turn, the use of the powers of imagination to create
images up until then unknown in the Primary World, such as a blue sun, a green
sky, a swine-man and a lizard-god. We have also seen that said sub-creation is the
expression of the intellectual virtue of art and, because of that, it must comply with
the rules of necessity and likeliness in its inner consistency of reality. In other
words, it must follow the general structures of what is real and simultaneously
modify some aspects of the Primary World—i.e., “sub-create” beings, settings, and
things, contributing to the contemplation of the general order of that reality.
In De Anima (427a17-428b30), Aristotle claims that imagination belongs to
the sensitive soul, responsible for emotions, and, in the Poetics (1449b–1450a), he
affirms that the goal of poetry, tragic in that case, is the catharsis, the purification
of emotions. One infers, thus, that imagination, by bringing knowledge restricted
to the sensitive soul, should be purified by the intellective soul in the philosophical
process of making truth explicit. Even though Aristotle, still in the Poetics (1451b–
1452a), considers poetry—which deals with the universals of human nature—more
philosophical than history—which considers the particulars of an event—he does
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not admit the possibility of a purely logical kind of knowledge (i.e., apodictic) being
transmitted by imagination. Poetics is, at most, a preparation, or an instrument for
philosophy, such as scholasticism considers philosophy in relation to theology.
In this sense, poetry is considered imitation (mimesis) of the forms (eidos)
of reality. The “universals”4 (katahalon) are seen as forms of the concrete beings,
whether their nature or their substantial forms, such as a man, a tree, or a horse, or
as a quality of any being, integrated in an individual, in their acts and character,
such as courage or wisdom, cowardness or stupidity. However, the universals in
poetry need not be the same as those in philosophy, because even though poetry
surpasses history, which deals with particulars, it is not philosophy as a logical
theory, devoid of the sensorial imagination. Thus, Aristotle himself, in the Poetics
(1460b–1461b) grants to the poet the possibility of metaphorically fabricating men,
gods, creatures, objects that do not exist in reality, as long as they follow the
principles of likeliness and necessity towards marveling (thaumaston), along with
the nature of man, its purpose (telos).
Indeed, Ricoeur (2005: 66–8) claims that the Aristotelian concept of mimesis
is not the same as the Platonic, since the latter understands it as a copy of visible
nature, which is, in turn, a copy of a supersensitive Idea/Form (eidos). The
Aristotelian mimesis, conversely, is an activity, a productive reason (poiesis),
through which men can build different realities than the ones originated in nature,
and connected to them at the same time.
By means of this emphasis, Tolkien claims that sub-creation is not only
about the representation or an allegorical interpretation of the Real, but its purpose
(telos) is a discovery, the invention of a new form (eidos), understood in its very
nature, with unique qualities and a morphology unknown up to then. In other words,
besides the green monster, one can create Elves, Dwarves, Orcs, and Hobbits,
fusing “accidents” (in metaphysical sense) of known forms, such as men, angels,
statues, pigs, wolves, bats, and gorillas. Here we bring back the first element of this

4 The issue of “universals” is traditional in Philosophy. Aristotle, in Categories (Iab20–Ib20), claims
that there are particular substances (primary, individual), universal substances (secondary, species,
and genera), particular qualities (the virtue in an individual), and universal qualities (the form of the
virtue). However, in Metaphysics (1038b10–15), he affirms that only the individual is substance, and
seemingly discards the theory of the universals as a secondary substance. The “universals”
disputation proceeds into medieval philosophy, and it “consists of establishing what the ontological
statute of universals is: whether they are transcendental Ideas, God’s thoughts and so forth, or
whether they are only mental concepts, or even insignificant words only, or whether there exists a
solution mediating the various positions” (Antiseri & Reale 2003: 154).
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article, an example of these primary principles in the structure of reality, in the
difference between natural and supernatural. According to Gilson (2000: 109):
There is, therefore, a poietic world, made of poietic beings, located
in the world of nature, yet specifically distinct from it. When the
objects which compose it are not recognized as such, the worst may
be feared, but whenever they are known in their true light, man treats
them according to their own character and dignity, that is to say as
works of art. Then it would seem that their origin in
disinterestedness and their beauty which enriches the world deserves
costly applause. […] Meanwhile, newcomers unknown to the state,
the professors and the public, but some-times encouraged by even
more obscure amateurs, yield to the old urge to add to the beauty of
the world by producing more objects whose only end is to be
beautiful, pleasing to see and desirable to own for their own sake.
Another way to understand this poietic world described by Gilson is to call it
Elfland. That is one of Tolkien’s great contributions to fairy-stories (2014: 30–32).
The nature of this place, which he calls Faërie, is what defines the essence of fairystories. It is coherent within the interpretation methods of this article to claim that
the Elfland is a metaphor—and, therefore, cannot be described analytically — for
this dimension that lies between the Platonic realms, the Realm of Forms
(supersensible) and the Physical Realm (sensible). This place is precisely the
imagination that contains all forms sub-created by language in fact, and potentially
“sub-creatable” by human creativity, establishing a relation, in a “Middle-earth”,
between what is perceptible by the senses and the intelligibility of Ideas.
In fact, Elves, Orcs, Dwarves, and Trolls are beings of fantastic thought,
constituted from the information brought by the senses which, for Tolkien (2014:
41) are altered by the human mind, capable of abstraction and generalization, thus
enabling the mythopoetic contribution to Creation. From the power of the adjective,
that is, from the abstraction of quality from concrete beings (in Aristotelian terms)
for the mind, the making of myths, the sub-creation of new forms is deployed and
the Elfland becomes accessible for contemplation. As Tolkien (2014: 42) affirms:
“new form is made; Fäerie begins; Man becomes a sub-creator.”
According to Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologica (II-II, q.180),
contemplation combines the goal of reason (to know things as they are) and of will
(to rest upon something delectable according to reason). Aquinas shows the
importance of imagination for the contemplation of truth, the ascending path from
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the sensible elements to the intelligible, and then to the truths revealed by Faith. By
commenting on Richard of St. Victor’s considerations, Thomas Aquinas admits the
inevitability of imagination as a means to acquire knowledge and contemplation,
especially in the so-called reasonable imagination (the rise from sensible to
intelligible in the study of the disposition and order of sensible things) and the
imaginative reason (the understanding of sensible beings by the intelligible).
The beauty of narrative art as mythmaking (mythopoeia) leads to the
contemplation of the perceived marvels (thaumaston), which follows towards the
intelligible and the invisible world (supernatural), because that is precisely what
binds the philomythus and the philosopher. In this sense, the gospels fulfill the
desire for communion with other living things and to survey the depths of space
and time that originate fairy-stories. According to Tolkien (2014: 74), the ‘oldest
and deepest desire’ expressed in these narratives is the search for the Great Escape,
the escape from Death. From that desire springs the consolation of a happy ending,
of the eucatastrophe, hence the redemptive culmination between legend and history
in Christ’s Gloria, in the conquering of death.
The importance of imagination as memory and fantasy is suggested by St.
Augustine in chapters 9 and 10 of On the Trinity, in the analogy between the triple
structure of human mind and the Christian Holy Trinity. The Bishop of Hippo
claims that there is Memory (imagination) as the source of our thought by means
of the preservation of images perceived by the senses; Intelligence, which, from
those images, operates the shaping of the concept and is responsible for the
perception of the intelligible (immaterial), expressing it in human language; and
Will, the action spurred by the love in human practices and in the concentration,
meditation, and focus on the comprehension of reality.
Analogically, the origin of Creation is the Divine Mind, God the Father,
while the logical structure of Creation is the Word itself, Logos, God the Son as
Wisdom, and the Holy Ghost, which manifests the Divine Will. It is possible to
infer from that analogy that Memory (imagination), both in us and in the Trinity,
does not have only a preservative function, to retain data, but also, and mostly,
generative, by proposing new forms from originality (fantasy), whether from God
the Father himself in Creation, or in the human mind, as the source of previously
unseen forms sub-created by the artist as a contribution for the beauty of the world.
To find the supernatural, that which is beyond nature and death, is the great
effort of mythical imagination. Even if the essential face of the fairy-stories is the
Magical towards Nature, by contrasting poetic fabulations with logical and
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metaphysical speculations, humanity refines the search for mystery, finding in
fantasy an ally that helps one go beyond what senses are unable to reach, and feed
what cold reasoning kills by starvation. Tolkien plays with that in a footnote (2014:
32), claiming that Elves may even be a particular way for Man to see the Truth,
with capital T (the only occurrence in the text), but because of that, they indicate
this transcendence inherent to nature as the contemplative way to reach the
supernatural. By superlatively looking at nature, the essence (eidos) of fairy-stories,
we amplify our perspective, we reflect upon the limits of our senses and then direct
our reason to that which escapes our own finiteness.
Therefore, one of Tolkien’s (2014: 32) definitions of Faërie is “the realm or
state in which fairies have their being.” The discussion about being is one of
Aristotle's conceptions of philosophy, the science that studies being as being, what
the realist tradition names metaphysics or ontology. In a platonic sense, we can
infer that this realm in which fairies exist is the intermediary world of Virtuality
where possible beings exist between the reality perceived by senses and the Realm
of Forms. In an Aristotelian sense, we can identify the state in which fairies have
their being as the imaginary formed by the images of individual substances received
through the perception of the senses, through which the active intellect abstracts the
universal form of things, enabling their recombination into fantastic beings.
In the Summa Theologica (I, q.15), Thomas Aquinas agrees with Augustine
that the Platonic Realm of Forms resides in the divine intellect. In the same
question, he claims that God knows everything, even if virtually, including the
things that do not, have not, and will not exist. Therefore, it is legitimate to suppose
that Elfland and its inhabitants are potentialities in the Divine Mind, waiting for
some unwary traveler to realize them by means of language, through the magic of
mythmaking.
FINAL REMARKS
In the last chapter of The Republic (10, 599c–608b), Plato resumes his well-known
criticism of the poets, holding that they lie when they describe the nature of men
and gods, being, at most, third class imitators (the idea itself, the material thing, and
the poetic image). His criticism has to do with the relation between art and the
criteria to investigate truth, which is further resumed in Aristotle’s Poetics, and the
connection between the poetic art and the intellectual virtues. Plato concludes the
subject acknowledging the debt philosophy owes to myth—just as Aristotle
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approaches the philomythus and the philosopher—and offers the poets the
opportunity to present arguments to rebuke his thesis concerning the falsehood and
harmfulness of mythmaking (mythopoeia), because he acknowledges the fascination that the art of imagination has over humanity:
Well, since we’ve brought up the subject of poetry again, let our
defence be this. Since that is what she is like, it was not unreasonable
for us to banish her from our city. Reason demanded it. And let us say
to her if she looks like accusing us of being harsh or uncultured, that
there is a long-standing antagonism between poetry and philosophy.
[…] And if, despite this, imitation, the poetry which is for pleasure,
has any argument to show that she should be included in a wellgoverned city, let our reply be that left to ourselves we would gladly
allow her back. We know how beguiling we ourselves find her. But it
is wrong to abandon what we believe to be true. Don’t you find that
as well, my friend? Don’t you find her beguiling especially when it is
through Homer that you behold her? (Plato 2000: 329)
The initial investigation of sub-creation as mythopoeia, taken as a poetic art (téchné
and poiesis), refers to the platonic paradigms according to the realist tradition.
However, in Tolkien’s works, such a perspective is associated to the Christian
analogy of Creator and Creation, according to its productive activity in Augustine’s
memory-imagination, in On the Trinity, establishing a Creative-sub-creative bond
between Divine and human imagination. On the other hand, the perspective of this
very mythmaking echoes the Aristotelian and Thomist epistemology and
gnoseology with the unity of intellectual virtues, practical or speculative, expressed
in the sub-creator’s need to comply with the inner consistency of reality, finding
the forms of substances and universals in the particular beings themselves,
considering the literary work of art, including fairy-stories, as carrying within them
such forms to be contemplated.
In this theoretical reflection about the realist philosophical tradition we find
the connection between philosophy and myth, emphasizing the concept of natural
and supernatural as explicated by the medieval scholasticism, recovering the
relevance of imagination and fantasy as a mimesis that not only reflects reality, but
is able to creatively contribute to it, rescuing the capacity to marvel with what is
real, including in intelligible dimensions, especially because of the strangeness provoked by fantastic forms. From this perspective, the eucatastrophe, the sudden turn
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to Goodness and Beauty, is not a mere literary resource provided by fairy-stories,
but also, analogically, a metaphysical affirmation confessing the adherence to a
Divine Providence and to the Christian faith in resurrection and in the redemption
of humanity.
We conclude this article by affirming that On Fairy-stories is a response to
Plato. Just like the gospels are a response to the eucatastrophic desire of fairystories, and as Christ, as Logos, is an answer to the investigations of pagan
philosophers, Tolkien attempts to purify and integrate fantasy to the realist
tradition, even if in the modest and everyday context of fairy-stories. Although it
may be a delusion by which the human mind is deceived by idolatry (Tolkien 2014:
65-66), fantasy can be a means to exercise the intellectual virtue of art and a way
for the human mind to seek transcendence through the images offered by Creation
(Tolkien 2014: 78-79). Tolkien meditated upon the relationship between his fields
of study as an academic, philologist, and writer, between his art and his Christian
faith, and devised a speculation that maintains a dialogue with millennia of cultural
heritage, from Semitic and Biblical matrices to the discussions on comparative
philology and folklore, informed by the scholastic worldview which was resumed
in the religious education in his time.

WORKS CITED
ANDERSON, Douglas A., and Verlyn Flieger (eds). 2014. Tolkien On Fairy-stories
– Expanded edition, with commentary and notes (London: HarperCollins)
ANTISERI, Dario, and Giovanni Reale. 2003. História da Filosofia: Patrística e
Escolástica, trans. by Ivo Storniolo (São Paulo: Paulus)
AQUINAS, St. Thomas. 2014. The Summa Theologica – Complete Edition, trans. by
the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Catholic Way)
EPUB Ebook
ARISTOTLE. 2019. Categorias, trans. by José Veríssimo da Mata (São Paulo: Unesp
Digital)
—— 2006. De Anima, trans. by Maria Cecília Gomes dos Reis (São Paulo: Editora
34)
—— 1990. Metaphysics, trans. by Richard Hope (Michigan: The University of
Michigan Press)

Published by ValpoScholar, 2021

23

Journal of Tolkien Research, Vol. 13 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 8

AUGUSTINE. 2002. On The Trinity: Books 8-15. ed. Gareth Matthews. trans. by
Stephen McKenna (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
BRAGUE, Rémi. 2013. Âncoras no Céu: A Infraestrutura Metafísica, trans. by
Nicolás Campanário (São Paulo: Loyola)
CARPENTER, Humphrey. 2002. J.R.R. Tolkien: A Biography, 6th edn (London:
HarperCollins)
CANDLER, PETER M. 2008. ‘Frodo and Zaratustra: Beyond Nihilism in Tolkien and
Nietzsche’, in Stratford Caldecott, Thomas Honegger. Tolkien’s The Lord
of The Rings: Sources of inspiration (Zurich and Jena: Walking Tree
Publishers), 137-168.
CASTRO, Susana de. 2009. ‘Paidéia e Ética em Aristóteles’, in Carvalho, João B.,
and Susana de Castro. Educação, Ética e Tragédia: Ensaios sobre a Filosofia
de Aristóteles (Rio de Janeiro: Nau), 81–94
DAWSON, Christopher. 1945. Progress and Religion: An Historical Enquiry
(London: Sheed & Ward)
FLIEGER, Verlyn. 2002. Splintered Light: Logos and Language in Tolkien’s World
(Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press)
—— 2003. ‘There would always be a fairy-tale’, in Jane Chance (org.). Tolkien the
Medievalist (London: Routledge), 26–35
GARDEIL, Henri-Dominique. 2013. Iniciação à Filosofia de São Tomás de Aquino:
Psicologia, Metafísica, trans. by Cristiane Negreiros Abbud Ayoub, and
Carlos Eduardo de Oliveira (São Paulo: Paulus)
GILSON, Etienne. 2000. The Arts of the Beautiful (Funks Grove: Dalkey Archive)
HAMMOND, Wayne G., and Christina Scull. 2017. The J.R.R. Tolkien Companion
and Guide: Chronology, 2nd edn (London: HarperCollins)
MCINTOSH, Jonathan. 2017. The Flame Imperishable: Tolkien, St. Thomas and the
Metaphysics of Faërie. (Kettering, OH: Angelico Press)
MILBANK, Alison. 2007. Tolkien and Chesterton as Theologian (New York: T&T
Clark)
NICOLAS, Marie-Joseph. 2001. ‘O vocabulário da suma teológica’, in St. Thomas
Aquinas. Suma teológica (São Paulo: Loyola), pp. 69–102
PIEPER, Josef. 2007. O Que É Filosofar?, trans. by Francisco de Ambrosis Pinheiro
Machado (São Paulo: Loyola)
PLATO. 2000. The Republic, ed. by G.R.F. Ferrari, trans. by Tom Griffith
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

https://scholar.valpo.edu/journaloftolkienresearch/vol13/iss2/8

24

KLAUTAU: Realism and Mythopoeia

PLATO. 2005. Phaedrus, trans. by Harold North Fowler (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press)
REALE, Giovanni. 2014. O Saber dos Antigos: Terapia para os Tempos Atuais,
trans. by Silvana Cobucci Leite (São Paulo: Loyola)
RICOEUR, Paul. 2005. A Metáfora Viva, trans. by Dion Davi Macedo (São Paulo:
Loyola)
SHIPPEY, Tom. 1992. The Road to Middle-earth (London: HarperCollins)
TESTI, Claudio. 2018. Pagan Saints in Middle-earth (Zurich and Jena: Walking
Tree)
TOLKIEN, J.R.R. 1995. The Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien, ed. by Humphrey Carpenter
and Christopher Tolkien (London: HarperCollins)
—— 2014. ‘On Fairy-stories’, in Tolkien On Fairy-stories, ed. by Douglas A.
Anderson, and Verlyn Flieger (London: HarperCollins), pp. 27–84

Published by ValpoScholar, 2021

25

